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8
Is the Public Sector Pay Advantage
Explained by Differences in Work Quality?
David Blackaby, Alan Felstead, Melanie Jones, Gerry
Makepeace, Philip Murphy, and Victoria Wass
8.1 . INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the common perception that work in the public
sector confers a ‘double premium’ of better quality work and better pay
(Bellante and Long, 1981), leading to feelings of ‘sector envy’ (Dolton and
Makepeace, 2011). In the past, these feelings have been exacerbated
by evidence which claimed to show that, in some cases, the pay of public
sector workers is 35 per cent higher than those working in the private
sector. Furthermore, it has also been claimed that equalizing the pay and
pensions of the public sector with the private sector would reduce public
expenditure (Holmes and Oakley, 2011, 2012). Although the evidence has
been hotly disputed, it has been used to promote the case for local ‘market-
facing’ pay deals in the public sector (Damant and Jenkins, 2011; Incomes
Data Services, 2011).
In addition to being wasteful of public expenditure, it has also been argued
that higher average levels of pay in the public sector have a number of other
damaging consequences. These include making it difﬁcult for private sector
business to compete with higher pay levels offered in the public sector;
sustaining variations in pay unrelated to public sector service quality; and
reducing the number of jobs that the public sector can support with any given
level of expenditure (Lambert, 2010). These claims are also widely contested
(Algan et al., 2002; Faggio and Overman, 2012).
Yet, to ensure that public sector pay is fair the government seeks independ-
ent advice from seven Pay Review Bodies (PRBs). They are tasked to review
pay levels and recommend annual pay rises given to public sector workers
such as teachers, doctors, nurses, police ofﬁcers, and senior civil servants. The
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ﬁrst PRB was set up in 1971 and the latest in 2014 (Home Ofﬁce, 2013).
Together their remit covers 2.25 million workers, which accounts for 40 per
cent of the 6.3 million strong public sector workforce, and their decisions
have an impact on a pay bill of £93 billion. Each PRB is given an annual
remit which varies according to a number of factors. These include the state
of public ﬁnances and hence the affordability of any recommendations;
recruitment and retention issues; and varying the size of the pay award by
grade or pay level in order to favour the low paid (see NHS Pay Review Body,
2014, appendix A).
However, while pay and other features of work such as ﬁnal salary
pension schemes—which have been phased out more slowly in the public
sector—have attracted much attention, little is known about the comparative
non-pecuniary advantages and disadvantages of working in the public as
opposed to the private sector. The notion of the public sector as a ‘good
employer’ suggests that one would expect to see a public sector advantage
here as well as in relation to pay. This chapter tests this notion by examining
inter-sector differences in the intrinsic quality of work which are evident in
data collected by surveys carried out in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2012 as part of
the Skills and Employment Survey (SES) series (see Technical Appendix). It
also examines how the sector gaps have changed over time. The chapter then
goes on to explore what effect the inter-sector differences identiﬁed have on
the public sector wage premium.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 outlines the theory of com-
pensating wage differentials as a framework within which to understand
inter-sector wage differences. Section 8.3 examines the possible sources of
the public sector pay premium as well as the limited evidential basis that
public sector jobs are better in other ways too. Section 8.4 outlines our
twofold analytical approach and the evidence base on which the chapter
draws. Section 8.5 outlines the bivariate ﬁndings on intrinsic features of work
which are rarely collected by ofﬁcial datasets—such as the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)—on
which most of the public–private sector pay gap literature is based.
Section 8.6 presents the results of a series of regressions which explore the
extent to which the public sector pay premium can be explained in terms of
the theory of compensating wage differentials. By carrying out separate
analyses by gender and at different points in the pay distribution we identify
for whom and at what pay levels there is evidence of a public sector wage
premium after accounting for differences in intrinsic work quality.
Section 8.7 ends the chapter with a summary and an outline of the implica-
tions for policy-makers who have used the raw pay gap data to justify
political interventions into pay-setting arrangements and for labour market
analysts who monitor movements in pay differentials.
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8.2 . COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
The theory of compensating wage differentials was conceived by Adam Smith
nearly 250 years ago. Simply stated, it argues that jobs which are more costly to
undertake, more disagreeable, involve more effort, or require more training will
command a higher wage because ‘the whole of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the different employments of labour and stock must, in the same
neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending toward equal-
ity’ (Smith, 1976, 111). This is expressed in equation (1), where undesirable
non-pay beneﬁts of working in sector 1 such as high work intensity and low
levels of autonomy are compensated by higher pay than in sector 2 where non-
pay beneﬁts are more desirable, and vice versa. In other words, if one job has
ceteris paribus a better (traditionally unobservable) attribute such as greater
autonomy or less stress, then the wages for that job will be lower in order to
compensate for the better non-pecuniary beneﬁts. Workers move between
jobs until net advantages are eliminated. In this model, wage rates embody a
set of implicit prices for different job characteristics. Any resulting pay
differences simply reﬂect differences in non-monetary characteristics of jobs,
thereby equalizing ‘net advantages’.
Duncan and Holmlund (1983, 366) note that there are few propositions
in labour economics with greater intuitive appeal than compensating wage
differentials. However, empirical results are mixed so that, while there is ‘some
clear support for the theory’, there are also ‘an uncomfortable number of
exceptions’ (Brown, 1980, 118, quoted in Duncan and Holmlund, 1983, 367).
Econometric difﬁculties turn on the inability to adequately control for all
relevant worker and job characteristics in typical cross-sectional datasets
and notably the non-monetary aspects of work, as contained in the Skills
and Employment Surveys (SES).
As an extension to this approach some researchers have advocated model-
ling the determinants of total reward (e.g. Danzer and Dolton, 2012; Leslie,
2008). This refers to the total present value of a number of items, including pay
as well as pensions and other beneﬁts in kind over the life course. While the
dataset used here measures whether or not the employer contributes to a
pension on behalf of respondents,1 the level of detail needed to pursue the total
Pay in sector 1
+ net value of non-monetary beneﬁts of
work in sector 1
= Pay in sector 2
+ net value of non-monetary beneﬁts of
work in sector 2
(1)
1 This shows a marked and, if anything, widening sector difference with those in the public
sector more likely to report that their employer contributes to their pension. In 2012, 79.6 per
cent of public sector workers reported that employer pension contributions were made on their
behalf compared to 45.6 per cent of private sector workers.
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rewards approach is not available—as its advocates acknowledge ‘data require-
ments for this research are high’ (Danzer and Dolton, 2012, 589). These
include pension membership rules, pension scheme parameters, the value of
employee and employer contributions, and scheme tenure. So, in line with
existing research on public–private sector pay comparison, differences in
pension arrangements are not factored into the analysis which follows.
8 .3 . EXPLANATIONS FOR SECTOR DIFFERENCES
There are reasons one might expect the non-pay quality of work to be higher
in the public sector. Historically, the public sector has striven to be a ‘good
employer’. This notion has roots extending back to the formation of the civil
service in the mid-19th century (Davies, 2012; Horton, 2006; Morgan and
Allington, 2002). The Royal Commission on the Civil Service, for example,
stated that while a ‘good employer’ need not necessarily offer its employees
high rates of pay, it did have to provide job security, joint consultation in the
form of collective bargaining and ‘carr[y] out a range of practices that would
today constitute good management, whether they be in the form of joint
consultation along civil service lines, fairness and equal opportunities’
(Priestley, 1955, paragraph 172). This idea was echoed a quarter of a century
later by Beaumont (1981), who attributed superior pay and conditions in the
public sector to the government pursuing model employment practices and
treating employees as stakeholders in the productive process. Almost three
decades later, the Black Review (2008) cited the public sector as a beacon of
good employment practice and looked to it to take forward the agenda of
enhancing health and well-being at work.
However, the evidence of superior working conditions in the public sector
tends to be inferred rather than based on direct evidence. The institutional
environment tends to be better in the public sector with higher union density,
and tighter regulation of employment practices and working conditions (see
Chapter 7 of this book; Bellante and Long, 1981; Jones et al., 2014). The latter
includes the 1997 Single Status Agreement which ensures that all local gov-
ernment staff receive equal pay for work of equal value, changes resulting from
the NHS Agenda for Change 2004 and the additional demands stemming
from the Public Sector Equality Duty which came into force in 2010. Using
employee rights in relation to equality as a marker of superior working
conditions, the public sector is seen to be a clear leader over the private sector.
According to the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011, the presence
of an equal opportunities policy was almost universal in the public sector—99
per cent of workplaces had one in 2011—compared to 74 per cent of private
sector workplaces (Bach et al., 2009; van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 116–18). More
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importantly, perhaps, the equality policies in the public sector are more likely
to be supported by substantive workplace practices, for example, the monitoring
of jobs by gender and ethnicity, ﬂexible working, and practices in relation to
requests for disability related adjustments (Hoque and Noon, 2004). Further-
more, it is argued that there is positive interaction between regulation and
unionization in the enforcement of individual rights in relation to equality, a
factor which has greatest impact in the public sector given its relatively high
levels of unionization (Hoque and Bacon, 2014).
There are also reasons why public sector workers are better paid. The employ-
ment proﬁles of each sector are very different (Incomes Data Services, 2011).
For example, professionals with speciﬁc service roles and high-level qualiﬁca-
tions are over-represented in the public sector, especially within healthcare
and education. Indeed, much of the pay gap disappears when controls for the
qualiﬁcations held by employees are included in wage equations. By taking
these structural differences into account, Emmerson and Jin (2012) report an
overall 8 per cent pay differential, which varies according to the time period
chosen, how the model is speciﬁed, and where in the earnings distribution the
gap is measured. In subsequent studies, Blackaby et al. (2012) and ONS (2012)
include further controls, including establishment size, and the pay gap disap-
pears completely for men and shrinks signiﬁcantly for women. Studies by
Disney and Gosling (1998), Blackaby et al. (1999), and Lucifora and Meurs
(2006) have also found that the adjusted public–private sector pay premium
decreases the further up the wage distribution you move, and that for men this
gap becomes negative for high-income earners. The public sector pay pre-
mium favours women and the low paid and can therefore be regarded as a
force for reducing inequalities in pay. This has sometimes been recognized in
the remits given to the PRBs which exempt those towards the bottom of the
earnings distribution from stringencies and/or suggest tighter controls on the
pay awards for those at the top (e.g. NHS Pay Review Body, 2014, appendix A).
There are grounds, then, for expecting that the intrinsic quality of work is
higher in the public sector and most empirical work indicates a public sector
pay premium. The coincidence of both better pay and better job quality in the
public sector presents a challenge to the compensating wage differential model
and therefore an important and interesting subject of study. However, there is
little quantitative evidence to substantiate many of the differences in non-
monetary beneﬁts of work in each sector. This chapter aims to ﬁll that gap by
addressing four aspects of intrinsic job quality. These include inter-sector
differences in the skill content of jobs; differences in discretion and autonomy
over job tasks; differences in work effort and work intensity; and differences in
perceived risk of job loss and anxiety about this and other aspects of work.
A distinctive feature of the SES data series is that most of these measures are
focused on the job and not the individual. We explore how inter-sector
differences have evolved over time (1997–2012) and, in particular, whether
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they have widened or narrowed. These differences in job quality are then
included as controls in the compensating wage differentials framework,
which allows us to evaluate whether there is a ‘double premium’ or whether
the wage differences can be accounted for by non-pay variations in the
quality of work.
8 .4 . EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The chapter is based on data collected in surveys of the working adult
population carried out in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2012.2 We follow as far as
possible the Ofﬁce for National Statistics’ (ONS) deﬁnition of the public sector
as comprising organizations which are wholly or mainly owned and controlled
by the government. Private sector ﬁrms, on the other hand, are organizations
which are mainly owned by private persons or shareholders who exercise
control over how these businesses are run. The ONS then goes on to list the
evidence on which this decision can be based. However, individuals are often
not in possession of such detailed information. Self-reporting by respondents
of sector is therefore subject to some error. In the surveys reported here—as in
many others—respondents are asked: ‘Is your organization a private sector
organization such as a company, or a public sector body such as local or national
government, schools, or the health service, or a non-proﬁt organization such as
a charity?’ Respondents are grouped into three categories according to the
responses given.3 The ofﬁcial deﬁnition of the public–private sector divide
puts non-proﬁt organizations into the private sector (Matthews, 2010) and we
follow this practice. The empirical work is based on a total pooled sample of
15,896 employees of whom 30.8 per cent work in the public sector.4
The empirical analysis is carried out in two ways. First, we examine inter-
sector differences in the non-monetary characteristics of work and assess if
workers in the public sector are privileged or disadvantaged in these terms. We
focus on four features of work which provide a potential source of a compen-
sating wage differential: job skills; discretion and autonomy; work intensity;
and insecurity and anxiety at work. These measures are focused on the job and
not the individual so, for example, job skills cover what qualiﬁcations, skills,
training, and learning are required to do the job. Some aspects are desirable,
2 A consistent public sector identiﬁer is available from 1997 onwards.
3 While the 1986 and 1992 surveys collected self-reported sector data, they did not provide
respondents with a three-option response or give examples of the type of organization. For this
reason, the 1986 and 1992 public–private sector variable is not consistent with later years. In
other publications such adjustments were not made (e.g. Felstead et al., 2013c; Gallie et al., 2013).
4 For each of the data points the comparative LFS estimates for public sector employment are
two percentage points lower than SES estimates.
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some less so. Autonomy and discretion at work, for example, are often
regarded as desirable features of work and are thought to be key characteristics
of professional roles, especially those involving the delivery of public services.
Similarly, protection from job insecurity (referred to by Adam Smith as the
constancy of employment) is a non-pecuniary and intangible beneﬁt which
might give rise to a compensating wage differential. Work intensity, on the
other hand, is commonly regarded as less desirable and may therefore be
compensated for in higher wages, other things being equal. We examine these
four features of work by reporting a set of simple summary statistics which
highlight signiﬁcant inter-sector differences and how these differences in work
quality have changed between 1997 and 2012.
Our analysis goes on to explore the public–private sector pay gap in the
context of a series of compensating wage models. These produce increasingly
like-for-like comparisons, so that the inter-sector wage differential is pro-
gressively measured net of all measured differences in characteristics and
requirements both at the level of the individual, the employment context,
and the job. The analysis presented in this chapter provides a much stronger
test of the contention that public sector workers are overpaid than a com-
parison based on unadjusted averages which fails to take into account the
differences outlined earlier. Furthermore, the data series allows us to take
into account a much more extensive range of characteristics and require-
ments than is typical. Datasets traditionally used to measure pay gaps (such
as LFS and ASHE) collect data on individual characteristics and gather
rather less on the nature of the job itself. While the effects of inter-sector
differences in workplace characteristics (such as pay-setting, management
structure, human relations policies) have been taken into account using the
management data collected by the Workplace Employment Relations Survey
alongside individual-level employee data (e.g. Chatterji et al., 2011), we have
a richer set of data on job quality at our disposal. Returning to equation (1),
greater work intensity, for example, is an undesirable feature of work which
will manifest itself in higher wages, so inter-sector differences in work
intensity will be ‘compensated’ for by an inter-sector wage differential.
Therefore, by introducing a set of controls associated with the non-monetary
characteristics of work, we may uncover sector-related ‘compensating differ-
entials’ not captured in previous analyses.
The SES series contains pay data along with data on a range of intrinsic
features of work. Based on the pay data alone, there is a prima facia case for the
public sector pay premium as reported in Table 8.1. Here, we compare the raw
percentage pay differential estimated from our data series with estimates from
ASHE and LFS. While there is variation between the ﬁgures generated
from different surveys, which is expected given differences in the sample,
measurement of earnings, and classiﬁcation of sector, the raw gap is in the
order of 10–15 per cent and there is consistent evidence that the gap is much
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greater for women. This suggests that the pay data at our disposal are
comparable to data collected by much larger sample surveys.
8 .5 . SECTOR DIFFERENCES IN THE NON-PAY
QUALITY OF WORK
8.5.1. Skill Requirements
The skill requirements of jobs are captured by three broad indicators: quali-
ﬁcations required on entry to the job, prior training for that type of work, and
initial post-entry learning while on the job. The ﬁrst draws data from a survey
question which asks respondents ‘if they were applying today, what qualiﬁca-
tions, if any, would someone need to get the type of job you now have?’ We
rank the qualiﬁcations given and put them into ﬁve categories. These range
from degree or equivalent to those who said that no qualiﬁcations would
be needed. Each level is given a score, with ‘4’ at the top and ‘0’ at the bottom.
The derived qualiﬁcation index is the average of these scores. We subtract the
private sector score from the public sector score in order to highlight sector
differences. We also examine: (a) whether the public–private sector gaps are
signiﬁcant at each data point; and (b) if these gaps have changed signiﬁcantly
over time in order to assess to what extent sector differences have contributed
to the evolution of non-pay inequalities at work. This analytical approach is
applied throughout this section.
The results show that jobs in the public sector demand higher skills than the
private sector as measured by the level of qualiﬁcations required on entry. For
example, degree-level jobs rose by ten percentage points in both the public and
private sectors—rising from 25.2 per cent in 1997 to 35.5 per cent in 2012 in
the public sector and from 12.1 per cent in 1997 to 22.7 per cent in 2012 in the
private sector (percentages not shown in Table 8.2). The gap in the required
Table 8.1. Public–Private Sector Percentage Pay Gaps, Gross Hourly Pay, 1997–2012
1997 2001 2006 2012
SES ASHE LFS SES ASHE LFS SES ASHE LFS SES ASHE LFS
All 14.4 8.1 15.7 10.7 3.3 8.4 11.7 9.5 10.4 12.9 15.7 10.0
Men 12.1 8.1 13.5 11.4 4.0 8.7 8.0 11.7 10.2 13.9 18.3 8.5
Women 33.8 25.6 31.6 24.1 19.3 20.3 26.8 23.6 22.3 19.5 28.7 22.2
Notes: the above ﬁgures are a percentage differential which is calculated as (public sector average wage –
private sector average wage) / (private sector average wage)*100. SES estimates are trimmed (1 per cent top
and bottom) throughout.
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Table 8.2. Public–Private Sector Gaps in the Non-Pay Quality of Work, 1997–2012
1997 2001 2006 2012 2012
Dimensions of the
quality of work (1)
Public–
private
sector gap
(2)
Public–
private
sector gap
(3)
Public–
private
sector gap
(4)
Public–
private
sector gap
(5)
Interaction
coefﬁcient
(6)
A. Skill requirements (scale differences)
Required qualiﬁcations 0.667*** 0.615*** 0.774*** 0.702*** 0.035
Training time 0.758*** 1.108*** 1.256*** 1.086*** 0.328
Learning time 0.370*** 0.374*** 0.468*** 0.605*** 0.235*
Literacy 0.470*** 0.434*** 0.480*** 0.456*** 0.014
Numeracy 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.107
Physical skills 0.328*** 0.117*** 0.177*** 0.134** 0.194**
Inﬂuence skills 0.357*** 0.308*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 0.028
Planning skills 0.291*** 0.236*** 0.244*** 0.253*** 0.038
Client communication skills 0.011 0.083** 0.096*** 0.177*** 0.188***
Problem-solving skills 0.061 0.018 0.040 0.037 0.098
Checking skills 0.043 0.056* 0.030 na 0.073
Emotional skills na na 0.362*** 0.398*** 0.036
Aesthetic skills na na 0.226*** 0.245*** 0.019
Computer-use skills 0.153* 0.158** 0.433*** 0.307*** 0.153
Sophisticated computer-use
skills
0.087 0.098** 0.240*** 0.148*** 0.060
B. Discretion at work (scale and percentage point item differences)
Task discretion index 0.069** 0.006 0.001 0.020 0.049
Supervision index 0.017 0.061** 0.127*** 0.006 0.023
A great deal of say in
decisions which change
the way you do your job
na 4.3*** 8.0*** 7.4*** 0.661*
Should you have more say
in decisions which affect
work?
na 2.3 10.7*** 8.9*** 1.31**
C. Work intensity (percentage point item differences)
Strongly agree: ‘my job
requires that I work
very hard’
9.2*** 8.6*** 12.3*** 11.8*** 1.09
Strongly agree: puts a lot of
effort into job beyond what
is required
2.1 2.8 4.0** 5.3** 1.17
D. Perceptions and experiences of insecurity (percentage point item differences)
A chance of job loss 0.7 7.2*** 3.7*** 3.9* 1.18
Recent work reorganization na 7.1*** 5.7*** 10.0*** 1.14
In future may have less say
in job
na na na 11.2*** na
In future may have less
ability to use skills
na na na 5.2** na
(continued )
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qualiﬁcation index has remained more or less unchanged at around 0.7 for
most of the period (see Table 8.2, panel A).
The second broad skills indicator, prior training, comes from the ques-
tion: ‘Since completing full-time education, have you ever had, or are you
currently undertaking, training for the type of work that you currently do?’
If ‘yes’, ‘How long, in total, did (or will) that training last?’ Eight responses
were possible ranging from no prior training (scoring ‘0’) needed at one
end of the spectrum to over two years (scoring ‘7’) at the other. The
training time index refers to an average of these scores. This produces
evidence to suggest that public sector jobs are associated with longer
periods of prior training with a signiﬁcant sector gap in the index at all
dates in the series. In 2012, for example, three out of ten public sector
workers (31.0 per cent) spent more than two years training for the job
compared to two of ten private sector workers (20.7 per cent). Although the
absolute sector gap has widened over time—in 1997 it was 0.758 but, by
2012, it had risen to 1.086—the rise was not large enough to be statistically
signiﬁcant (note the positive, but insigniﬁcant, 2012 interaction term in
column 6 of Table 8.2).
The third broad skills indicator, initial post-entry learning, is based on the
question: ‘How long did it take for you after you ﬁrst started doing this type of
job to learn to do it well?’ Six responses were possible ranging from ‘less than a
month’ (scoring ‘1’) to ‘over two years’ (scoring ‘6’). The learning time index
refers to an average of these scores. Again, the public–private sector differences
in job skills at each data point are signiﬁcant with public sector jobs requiring
Table 8.2 Continued
1997 2001 2006 2012 2012
Dimensions of the
quality of work (1)
Public–
private
sector gap
(2)
Public–
private
sector gap
(3)
Public–
private
sector gap
(4)
Public–
private
sector gap
(5)
Interaction
coefﬁcient
(6)
In future may have pay
reduced
na na na 10.7*** na
In future may be moved to a
less interesting job
na na na 5.3** na
Notes: both the descriptive data (columns 2–5) and regression results (column 6) are weighted. Columns
2–5 report t-tests of the public–private sector from the private sector differences, while column 6 reports the
2012* sector interaction variable (i.e. whether the public–private sector gap in 2012 is signiﬁcantly larger than
the gap in 1997 or the earliest year for which data are available). For linear regressions, the interaction
coefﬁcient equates, subject to rounding, to the difference between columns 5 and 2. For logistic regressions
(where items are reported using percentages), the interaction coefﬁcient presented in column 6 is the odds
ratio. *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively;
‘na’ denotes question not available at the survey point.
Source: SES
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longer initial post-entry learning. On these three measures, then, public sector
jobs are substantially more skilled than those in the private sector, on average.
This is true in all four years in the series. Furthermore, the sector gap on this skill
measure increases signiﬁcantly over time (see positive and signiﬁcant 2012
interaction term in column 6 of Table 8.2).
Respondents to the four surveys were also asked: ‘in your job, how import-
ant is [a particular job activity]?’ Examples of the activities included: ‘using a
computer’; ‘analysing complex problems’; and ‘adding, subtracting, multiply-
ing, or dividing numbers’. The 2012 questionnaire covered forty-four activities
with previous surveys carrying somewhat fewer. Respondents were asked
to pick from a ﬁve-point scale which ranged from ‘essential’ (scoring ‘4’) to
‘not at all important’ (scoring ‘0’). Factor analysis produced the ten types of
generic skills. To these we add two measures of generic computer use. The
ﬁrst measures the importance of computer use at work. The second asks
respondents whether they draw on ‘advanced’, ‘complex’, ‘moderate’, or
‘straightforward’ computer skills with each level accompanied by concrete
examples of such use. From this we derive a computer skills sophistication
index. This ranges from no use at all (scoring ‘0’) to ‘advanced’ use
(scoring ‘4’).
Examination of these data reveals that public and private sector jobs are
different in terms of the type of skills that are required and, once again, the
suggestion is that public sector jobs require higher skills. Public sector jobs
require higher skills in terms of literacy, inﬂuencing abilities, planning, emo-
tional labour, aesthetic labour, and computer use. However, private sector jobs
require signiﬁcantly more from workers in terms of numeracy skills, physical
effort, and client communication (such as selling products and services and
advising customers). Out of twelve generic skills, seven were signiﬁcantly in
favour of the public sector in 2012, but only three favoured the private sector.
There is no consistent pattern of change over time.
8.5.2. Discretion and Autonomy
The survey series carries a set of questions which address how much personal
inﬂuence employees report they have over four speciﬁc aspects of their jobs:
how hard they work; deciding what tasks they are to do; how the tasks are
done; and the quality standards to which they work. The response options
range from ‘a great deal’, ‘a fair amount’ to ‘not much’ and ‘not much at all’.
A task discretion index was derived by awarding scores ranging from 3 to 0 for
each of these responses.
Despite earlier evidence that jobs in the public sector require higher quali-
ﬁcations on entry, involve lengthier training time, take longer to learn to do
well once in post, and (in many respects) entail higher generic skills, discretion
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levels differed little between the sectors in 2012. However, in 1997 public
sector workers enjoyed signiﬁcantly higher levels of discretion, but from then
onwards discretion levels between the sectors have narrowed signiﬁcantly and
become negligible (see Table 8.2, panel B).
Discretion is related to supervision. Respondents were, therefore, asked: ‘How
closely are you supervised in your job?’We derive a supervision index from the
responses given, ranging from ‘not at all closely’ (scored as ‘1’) to ‘very closely’
(scored as ‘4’). The results using this index mirror the trajectory of change
for discretion reported above. Supervision over public sector workers’ jobs
grew in the 1997–2006 period and discretion fell. However, since then both the
supervision and discretion gaps between the sectors have disappeared.
Respondents were also asked: ‘Suppose there was going to be some
decision made at your place of work that changed the way you do your
job. Do you think that you personally would have any say in the decision
about the change or not?’ Here we report the proportion who said that they
would have ‘a great deal’ of say in the resulting changes. Private sector
employees were signiﬁcantly more likely to report enjoying such a level of
job control. This four–eight percentage point advantage was maintained at
each of the three data points, with a signiﬁcant widening of the gap between
2001 and 2012.
Dissatisfaction with such relatively tight—and to some extent tightening—
control of the labour process among public sector workers can be seen in the
growing desire for more job control relative to their private sector peers. At
each of the three data points, around a third of private sector employees
reported that they would like to have more say in decisions that affected
their work. However, among public sector workers such a desire grew from
40.1 per cent in 2001 to 46.5 per cent eleven years later, with the resulting
public–private sector gap growing from 2.3 percentage points to 8.9 points
over this period. This represents a signiﬁcant widening of the public–private
sector gap (see Table 8.2, panel B).
Overall, these results suggest that the government’s modernization of the
public sector agenda—both New Labour and the Conservative/Liberal Demo-
crat Coalition—and the increased emphasis this placed on the marketization
of the public sector was having an effect on the quality of work in the public
sector. In particular, public sector workers’ relative room for autonomy was
shrinking and with it resentment levels were rising.
8.5.3. Work Intensity
To capture work intensity overall we use responses given to the question:
‘please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the statement: my job
requires that I work very hard’. If respondents strongly agreed, we deﬁne their
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job as involving ‘hard work’. Such hard-working jobs are more prevalent in the
public sector than in the private sector. For example, in 2012 over half (52.8
per cent) of public sector jobs required employees to work very hard compared
to around two ﬁfths (41.0 per cent) of those working in the private sector, with
signiﬁcant gaps reported at each data point. Even so, the magnitude of the gap
grew by around three percentage points between 1997–2001 and 2006–2012
(cf. Felstead et al., 2013c). However, this widening gap is not statistically
signiﬁcant (see Table 8.2, panel C).
In addition to non-discretionary effort levels respondents were asked about
discretionary work effort which they voluntarily give to the organization.
Respondents were asked: ‘How much effort do you put into your job beyond
what is required?’ A list of options were read out. These were: ‘a lot’, ‘some’,
‘only a little’, or ‘none’. We report the percentages saying ‘a lot’. The results
suggest a similar to pattern to those revealed by the required work effort data;
discretionary work effort is higher in the public sector than in the private
sector for all of the data points, with statistically signiﬁcant differences com-
mon towards the end of the period. However, the differences between the
sectors have not grown signiﬁcantly.
8.5.4. Insecurity and Anxiety
Given the economic uncertainty and austerity in the public sector which
followed the 2008–2009 recession, it is unsurprising that in 2012 respondents
in both sectors reported historically high levels of job insecurity—around a
quarter thought that they stood a chance of losing their job in the next twelve
months (Gallie et al., 2013). However, job insecurity rose more sharply in the
public sector, rising signiﬁcantly by almost twelve percentage points between
2006 and 2012. In contrast, it rose by a more modest (and statistically
insigniﬁcant, p>0.1) four percentage points in the private sector. This is a
reversal of the pattern established in previous years. The gap was against the
public sector in 2012 and was around four percentage points (p<0.1). How-
ever, a similar sized gap, but in favour of the public sector (and at higher levels
of signiﬁcance, p<0.01), was recorded in 2006. The gap was even more
favourable to public sector workers in 2001 when the gap was around seven
percentage points. However, there was little sectoral difference in 1997 (see
Table 8.2, panel D).
The data also suggest that work reorganization is more prevalent in the
public sector than in the private sector. In the former, around two thirds (66.4
per cent) of respondents who were in work with the same employer ﬁve, four,
and three years ago reported changes to the way work was organized in 2012
compared to approaching three out of ﬁve (56.4 per cent) private sector
respondents. Furthermore, a greater proportion of public sector respondents
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rated these as ‘major’ rather than ‘minor changes’; in both 2012 and 2006 the
gap was around six to seven percentage points. This suggests a more turbulent
workplace environment for those working the public sector.
Despite their relative protection from unfair treatment (Fevre et al., 2009),
public sector employees expressed signiﬁcantly more anxiety about job down-
grading in the future than private sector employees. Over a quarter reported
feeling ‘very’ or ‘fairly anxious’ about being moved to a less interesting job
(26.3 per cent) and/or having less ability to use their skills at work (27.9 per
cent). Over a third (38.5 per cent) worried that they might have less say in their
job in the future and approaching a half (44.8 per cent) were concerned that
their pay might be reduced. In all four areas, anxiety levels in the public sector
were signiﬁcantly higher than in the private sector, but the differences
with regard to pay and autonomy were especially marked with gaps in double
ﬁgures (see Table 8.2, panel D).
8 .6 . PUBLIC SECTOR PAY GAPS, STRUCTURAL
VARIATION, AND NON-PAY QUALITY OF WORK
DIFFERENCES
In this section we bring together the job quality indicators discussed above and
pay data outlined earlier. In so doing, we examine the impact that job quality
has on the public sector pay premium. We begin by measuring the raw hourly
pay gap between public and private sector employees over time and then
proceed to examine how much of it can be explained by differences in
individual characteristics (such as sex, age, and education) and employment
characteristics (such as workplace size, occupation, and contractual status).
Finally, job quality-related controls are also added (where available consist-
ently between 1997 and 2012). Consider, for example, job skills requirements.
If working in the public sector involves using higher level skills, we might
expect public sector wages to be higher to reﬂect the enhanced demands of the
job. Inclusion of a job characteristic can either close or extend the pay gap but,
if job quality is related to wages and is differentially distributed by sector,
inclusion will provide a more precise measure of any pay premium which is
speciﬁc to the public sector.
Regression analysis provides the standard method for measuring the public
sector wage premium while controlling for the effect of individual, employ-
ment, and job characteristics. We assume that we have a list of variables (xk)
that affect earnings and capture the effect of sector by including an indicator
variable (PUBit) which shows whether or not the individual is employed in the
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 9/2/2015, SPi
160 Is Public Sector Pay Advantage Explained Work Quality?
Comp. by: Jayapathirajan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002478979 Date:9/2/15 Time:16:17:47
Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002478979.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 161
public sector. We then regress the natural logarithm of earnings on these
variables. Thus,
lnEit ¼ μtPUBit þ xitβt þ εit i ¼ 1; .. ;Nt; t ¼ 1997; .. ; 2012 ð2Þ
where i indexes the ith individual and t the survey year. E is hourly earnings
and x={1, x2 . . . , xK} is 1K vector of variables, where the ﬁrst variable is the
constant 1 and the remaining variables measure individual, employment, and
job characteristics. b is a 1K vector of parameters capturing the impact of
the corresponding variable on log earnings.  is the random error term which
satisﬁes the standard OLS assumptions.
The estimate of the coefﬁcient of the public sector variable (mt) measures the
difference in log earnings for two individuals with exactly the same observable
characteristics (values for xk) but where one works in the public sector (so
PUBit=1) and the other works in the private sector (PUBit=0). It measures the
public sector pay premium, that is, the increase in the log earnings for an
employee working in the public sector compared to those of employees in the
private sector matched in terms of measured characteristics. In estimating
the public sector premium the model assumes that these characteristics have
the same inﬂuence on earnings across sectors. For example, the returns to
education are constrained to be the same in both the public and private sectors.
We run this regression ﬁrst with just the public sector identiﬁer and, where
the data are pooled across time, a control for survey year to capture trends in
nominal earnings. The coefﬁcient on public sector reported in Table 8.3,
column 1, row 1 measures the resulting raw unadjusted public sector pay
gap. We add further sets of control variables in succession beginning with
individual characteristics and report the adjusted public sector premia in
columns 2–5. The speciﬁcation reported in column 2 is broadly equivalent
in terms of methodology to that of Emmerson and Jin (2012). A set of controls
for employment characteristics is included in column 3. The public sector pay
premium here is broadly equivalent in terms of methodology to that estimated
by Blackaby et al. (2012) and ONS (2012). Job quality variables, including job
skill requirements, measures of autonomy and discretion, work intensity, and
job security are included as further controls with the public sector premium
reported in column 4. The impact of including the job quality variables
without personal and employment characteristics is apparent from column
5. Here, the job quality variables in the SES reduce the public sector pay
premium as, if not more, effectively than the more traditional personal and
employment-related characteristics. Separate regressions are run for each year
(rows 2–5) and for men, women, full-time, and part-time employees (rows
6–9) of Table 8.3. Further regressions are run at the ﬁve quantile points of the
earnings distribution and are reported in rows 10–14.
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The coefﬁcients indicate the size of the public sector premium. These log
points are multiplied by 100 in what follows with percentage mark-ups in
parentheses (where log points and percentages differ). The results presented in
Table 8.3 are comparable both across columns and down rows. The raw public
sector premium across the four surveys is 15.1 log points (or 16.3 per cent)
(see Table 8.3, row 1). Looking across the columns of row 1, factoring in
personal characteristics such as gender, age, and educational attainment
reduces the gap to 7.4 log points (or 7.7 per cent). When employment-related
characteristics are also added, the public sector pay gap shrinks further to 3.0
per cent, although the premium remains statistically signiﬁcant. Importantly,
when measures of intrinsic job quality are taken into account at the aggregate
level (columns 4 and 5, rows 1–5) the public–private sector pay gap disappears
in all speciﬁcations except one where it remains weakly signiﬁcant (p<0.1).
However, it remains signiﬁcant for certain groups of employees which we
consider below.
The raw unadjusted gap is greater for women (25.0 log points or 28.4 per
cent) than for men (13.4 log points or 14.3 per cent). Furthermore, for women
the pay gap shrinks to 2.2 per cent in the full model (column 4), but it remains
statistically signiﬁcant, while for men it disappears completely and is negative,
although not signiﬁcant. In so far as the public sector offers a wage premium
this seems to be restricted to women and is consistent with a lower gender
wage gap within the public sector (see Jones et al., 2014). The pattern for full-
time employees is similar to that of male workers and so the public–private
sector pay gap disappears when the quality of work indicators are added to the
model (see row 8 of Table 8.3). The unadjusted public sector pay gap for part-
time employees, who are predominately female, is far higher at 29.6 log points
(or 34.4 per cent) and a premium of 3.4 log points (or 3.5 per cent) remains
after accounting for the most comprehensive set of controls (column 4). This
is greater than the 2.2 per cent premium for all females.
When the regressions are run at different points on the earnings distribu-
tion using quantile regressions, the public sector premium is found to decrease
as earnings increase. So, in the full model (see column 4, Table 8.3), those who
work in the public sector and whose hourly pay is in the bottom 10 per cent of
the distribution receive 4.9 log points (or 5.0 per cent) more than an otherwise
identically placed private worker. Those in the bottom quartile receive 4.1 log
points (or 4.2 per cent) more and median earners 2.6 per cent more. However,
in the top half of the pay distribution the advantages of working in the public
sector disappear and for the top earners they are reversed. Those in the top
decile, for example, earn 3.3 log points (or 3.4 per cent) less than equivalent
counterparts who work in the private sector (see rows 10–14, column 4,
Table 8.3). The pattern of advantage/disadvantage found for public sector
workers at the bottom and top ends of the earnings distribution reported
here is broadly similar to that found elsewhere for the UK, most notably by
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Blackaby et al. (1999 and 2012), Disney and Gosling (1998), and Murphy et al.
(2014).
In further speciﬁcations estimated separately by gender for each year
(results not reported), the unadjusted gap is signiﬁcant for men throughout
the period. The fully adjusted gap is insigniﬁcantly different from zero across
all years and for part-time or full-time status. In contrast, for females, the
unadjusted gap is larger and while the gap tends to narrow as additional
controls are included in the model, it remains signiﬁcant for part-time and
full-time workers and is especially pronounced for part timers. Across the
distribution, the adjusted differential is insigniﬁcantly different from zero for
men until the 90th percentile when there is evidence of a public sector pay
penalty. While the latter is also evident for women, the public sector premium
is most pronounced at the bottom end of the distribution and is signiﬁcant at
points up to and including the median.
8 .7 . CONCLUSION
It is popularly assumed that public sector workers enjoy better pay and better
terms and conditions than their private sector counterparts. Reports of aver-
age pay comparisons, for example, frequently generate headlines such as ‘You
are £86 a week better off if you work in the public sector’ (Mail Online, 22
November 2012). Such reports often go on to claim—based on little or no
evidence—that public sector workers are advantaged in other ways too, such
as working under less pressure, enjoying greater job security, and getting
better pensions. The presumption of a ‘double premium’ has been used to
justify public sector pay restraint. This chapter has presented evidence which
challenges this notion by ﬁrst examining sector differences in the qualitative
aspects of work and second by showing how differences in these qualitative
characteristics can explain the unadjusted public sector pay mark-up on which
many of these newspaper headlines are based.
Differences in the quality of work are most pronounced in terms of job skill
requirements which are consistently higher in the public sector. For example,
public sector jobs are higher skilled in terms of the level of qualiﬁcation required
on entry, the length of prior training for that type of work, and the length of
initial post-entry learning needed to get up to speed. However, contrary to the
‘double premium’ presumption public sector jobs do not offer workers more
autonomy. In fact, according to some measures they have far less say at work
and the gap between the sectors has been moving against public sector workers.
We also ﬁnd that workers in the public sector work harder and expend more
discretionary effort than their private sector counterparts. Furthermore, the
growth in perceived levels of job insecurity in the public sector in the period
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2001–2012 means job stability is no longer a positive feature of public sector
employment, with work reorganization also more prevalent than in the private
sector.
Consistent with the earlier literature we ﬁnd evidence of a raw hourly
earnings gap which favours the public sector. This narrows with the inclusion
of personal and employment-related characteristics but remains signiﬁcant (at
about 3 per cent). Previous analyses have stopped at this point since data on
job quality are not collected in ofﬁcial surveys such as the LFS and
ASHE. However, we have taken the analysis a step further by adding in data
on features of the intrinsic quality of work which contribute to explaining
some of the remaining pay gap. The inclusion of these features reduces the
wage premium to insigniﬁcantly different from zero overall and reduces
the premium for women from 5.7 per cent (i.e. 5.5 log points) to 2.2 per
cent. So, in so far as there is a public sector pay premium, it is much smaller
than has been suggested and its beneﬁts are conﬁned to women (and may
therefore explain the lower gender pay gap in the public sector) and particu-
larly those who are low paid (with positive effects in terms of poverty and
equality outcomes).
The policy implications of these ﬁndings are twofold. First, Pay Review
Bodies which review and recommend the pay of public sector workers need to
note how the inclusion of job quality measures almost eliminates the overall
pay gap. Their ‘market-facing’ pay reports have acknowledged how a number
of key structural differences between the two sectors may account for a pay
gap (e.g. NHS Pay Review Body, 2012, chapter 2). The employment proﬁles of
each sector are very different. For example, professionals with speciﬁc service
roles and high-level qualiﬁcations are over-represented in the public sector,
especially within healthcare and education. Indeed, much of the pay gap
disappears when these factors are controlled for in wage equations
(Emmerson and Jin, 2012; Blackaby et al., 2012). This chapter suggests that
using a richer set of variables that control for the quality of work further
reduces the pay gap. Far from promoting and sustaining a double premium,
the setting of public sector pay appears to have equalized the current reward
package between the sectors.
Second, restraining public sector pay can have important implications for
recruitment and retention issues in the public sector. Nickell and Quintini
(2002), for example, noted that the marked decline in relative public sector pay
in the 1980s resulted in a decline in the quality of men entering teaching and
public sector general administration in the early 1990s, when measured using
ability scores compared to the late 1970s. Clearly, it is important that wage rates
in the public sector are high enough to attract and retain individuals with the skills
and qualiﬁcations to deliver high-quality public services. The long-standing
public sector wage penalty observed at the upper tail of the wage distribution
(Blackaby et al., 1999 andMurphy et al., 2014) has implications for the delivery
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of high-quality public services which are also worth scrutiny by the Pay Review
Bodies. Furthermore, the tendency for low-paid women to be treated more
favourably in the public sector is likely to be weakened if public sector pay is
restrained across the board (Cribb and Sibieta, 2013). This will have conse-
quences for the egalitarian tendencies—sometimes prompted by government—
which PRBs have successfully followed for a number of years.
The chapter also has lessons for labour market researchers. Foremost
among them is the ﬁnding that entering the quality of work indicators alone
into our wage equations produces similar results to the full model. This
suggests that they are powerful indicators alone and are helpful in providing
further explanatory power over and above standard individual and employ-
ment-related characteristics. They are therefore indicators worth collecting in
order to fully understand pay differentials and the extent to which differences
in the quality of work are reﬂected in the extrinsic rewards employees receive.
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